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No Notice, No Hearing, No Problem?
The Constitutionality of North Carolina's
Prejudgment Statute
INTRODUCTION
Jerry distributes sports memorabilia from his residence in South
Carolina to dealers throughout the United States. Jerry also regularly
invests in real property, recently acquiring some very expensive real
estate in downtown Charlotte, North Carolina. More recently, Jerry
contracted to sell to Claudia-a North Carolina memorabilia dealer,
and regular customer of Jerry's-thousands of dollars worth of sports
collectibles. Unfortunately, a few days after their agreement, Jerry
repudiates by informing Claudia that he will be unable to ship such a
large quantity of goods. As a result, Claudia is forced to cover by
purchasing substitute memorabilia costing an additional $60,000.
Consequently, Claudia brings an action against Jerry to recover her
losses.
Beth, Claudia's attorney, is aware that Jerry recently acquired real
property in North Carolina and advises Claudia that she will seek an
order attaching Jerry's property when she files the action with the
court. Beth tells Claudia that, by attaching the property, a North Caro-
lina court can obtain jurisdiction to hear the action and that any judg-
ment awarded in her favor can be satisfied by selling the property.
Beth understands that Jerry has sufficient contacts with North Caro-
lina to allow a court to bind him personally, but she thinks that attach-
ing another person's property is much more exciting. Claudia is
amenable to the idea because she is still mad at Jerry for breaching
their contract and thinks that placing a lien on the property will cause
Jerry to have a few sleepless nights.
Accordingly, contemporaneous with filing the suit, Beth seeks an
order attaching Jerry's property in Charlotte. The order of attachment
is issued and she drives to Charlotte and files the order with the clerk
of court. The clerk promptly adds the order to the lis pendens docket.
The next day, Beth causes the sheriff to endorse the order of attach-
ment and deliver a certificate of levy to the clerk of court. Upon
receipt of the certificate and docketing of the levy, the lien attached
and relates back to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. Thirty days
after the order of attachment issued, Jerry is served with process. It is
then that he learns that his property has been attached and that a lien
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has been placed on the property. Jerry is very confused and upset
because he did not have any notice of the attachment or any way to
object to it. As a result of this temporary deprivation of his property
rights, Jerry has more than just a few sleepless nights.
Prejudgment statutes, like the one Claudia utilized to attach
Jerry's property, have always presented due process concerns. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that
"[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' This Clause has been interpreted to have
both substantive and procedural components.2 Substantively, the Due
Process Clause restricts the government's actions, regardless of the
procedures used.3 One such due process restriction is that a court
must obtain jurisdiction over an action before it can enter a judgment
against a person.4 On the other hand, procedural due process ensures
that a party, whose rights are going to be affected, is given notice and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
("Although a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the
procedures [of a state,] . . . the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive
component as well .... "); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932) ("It never has
been doubted by this [C]ourt, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing
are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that
they, together with a legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case,
constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law.").
The Author will discuss both components throughout this Comment. To avoid
confusion, the Author will use the term "due process" to refer to substantive due
process. The Author will use the term "procedural due process" when referring to the
procedural component.
3. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
4. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 715 (1877) (syllabus) ("The term, 'due process
of law,' when applied to judicial proceedings, means a course of legal proceedings
according to those rules and principles which have been established by our
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such
proceedings any validity, there must be a competent tribunal to pass upon their
subject-matter; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of
the defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within
the State, or by his voluntary appearance."), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977). See also Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A
Comparative and Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 965 (1995) (noting that International Shoe Co. v. Washington clearly
relied on notions of substantive due process in creating constitutional standards for
personal jurisdiction); Charles Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and
Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REv. 567 (2007) (discussing the relationship between
constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and substantive due process).
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an opportunity to be heard.5 Thus, procedurally, due process
"require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and [an] opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case."6
Prejudgment statutes primarily raise concerns with regard to the
procedural aspect of due process. These statutes allow a plaintiff to
seek attachment of a defendant's property in order for a court to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction7 in the state in which the property is
located.8 However, an order of attachment can be issued regardless of
whether the defendant has been given notice that there is a pending
lawsuit against him. In fact, under North Carolina's prejudgment stat-
utes,9 a defendant may not receive notice of the pending principal
action and ancillary attachment until thirty days after a lien has
5. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of
[procedural] due process .. .is the opportunity to be heard." (citation omitted)).
6. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The
Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to this general rule on a few occasions. With
respect to prejudgment statutes, the Court has stated that there must be
"'extraordinary situations' [to] justify postponing notice and opportunity for a
hearing." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). The instances where the Court has found "extraordinary
situations" will be discussed below. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
7. It is important to note the differences between in personam, in rem, and quasi
in rem jurisdiction. See 1 ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM B. RICHMAN, JURISDICTION IN
CIVIL ACTIONS § 1-1 (3rd ed. 1998). If a court has in personam jurisdiction
(jurisdiction over the person), the court has the power to obligate a party to comply
with its orders and the power to bind the party. Id. In rem jurisdiction, on the other
hand, is power over property within the state where the court is located and is limited
to suits determining ownership of property, as against all other persons in the world.
Id. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is separated into two types of actions. The first type is
similar to an action in rem, in that it is a suit to settle claims in property, except that
the court looks at the claims of particular persons, not the claims of all other persons.
Id. In the second type of action, a plaintiff does not have a preexisting interest in
specific property, but a personal claim against the defendant and the court uses its
power over property located in the state to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. This
jurisdiction is obtained by attaching the defendant's property and a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff can be executed against the attached property. Id. The second type of
quasi in rem jurisdiction is discussed in this Comment.
8. Prejudgment statutes also allow a plaintiff to attach a defendant's property to
enable the property to be secured from destruction or disposal prior to a lawsuit. In
North Carolina, attachment is allowed to both obtain jurisdiction and secure property.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3 (2007). However, this Comment will primarily focus on
the attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction.
9. See id. §§ 1-440.1 to .46.
55920091
3
Jennings: No Notice, No Hearing, No Problem? The Constitutionality of North
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2009
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
attached to the defendant's property.1" Moreover, the defendant is not
provided an opportunity for a hearing prior to his property being
attached.'1 Thus, by allowing attachment of property without notice
or a prior hearing, prejudgment statutes must be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that they comport with procedural due process.
Accordingly, this Comment will analyze the constitutionality of
North Carolina's prejudgment statutes. Part I will take a brief look at
the history of prejudgment statutes and the "power" doctrine articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.l2 Part II
will discuss the impact of subsequent Supreme Court cases. This Part
will be divided into two subsections. The first will address cases that
shaped our nation's jurisdictional law and, most importantly, affected
the necessity of quasi in rem jurisdiction. The second will address
cases that impacted the analytical process for evaluating prejudgment
statutes as they relate to procedural due process concerns. Finally,
Part III will indicate that several portions of North Carolina's prejudg-
ment statute are unconstitutional. This determination will be based
on a comparison between the necessity of attaching property to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction in a state that allows for the broad exercise of
in personam jurisdiction and the importance of providing the protec-
tions afforded under the Due Process Clause.
I. HISTORY OF PREJUDGMENT STATUTES AND PENNOYER V. NEFF
A. Brief History of Prejudgment Statutes in Early America
The attachment of a debtor's property to satisfy the claims of his
creditors is an ancient proceeding, which some have linked back to
early Roman law.13 There is no doubt, however, that attachment pro-
10. In North Carolina, service of summons can be made up to 30 days after the
issuance of the order of attachment. Id. § 1-440.7. Once the order of attachment has
been issued, the attachment lien will attach as soon as the plaintiff files the order with
the clerk of court of the county in which the property being attached is located, id.
§ 1-440.33, the plaintiff causes the sheriff to endorse the order and deliver a certificate
of levy to the clerk of court, id. § 1-440.17, and the clerk indexes and dockets the levy,
id. § 1-440.33. Once attached, the lien relates back to the date on which the order was
initially filed with the clerk of court. Id.
11. If the plaintiff files an affidavit under section 1-440.11 of the North Carolina
General Statutes and furnishes the required bond under section 1-440.10, the "court
shall issue an order of attachment." Id. § 1-440.12.
12. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
13. CHARLES D. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES § 1 (7th ed. 1891).
560 [Vol. 31:557
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ceedings existed in England as early as 1482.14 It was the custom of
London that a "creditor might attach money or goods of the defendant
* . . by proceedings in the mayor's court or in the sheriffs court."15
This custom developed out of necessity to provide a remedy for "col-
lecting debts due from nonresident or absconding debtors."' 6 Thus,
when a default judgment was entered against a debtor because he
failed to appear before the court, the creditor could satisfy the judg-
ment by having the sheriff sell any attached property. However, as the
custom developed into common law, it was changed significantly. The
most obvious change was the requirement of notice to the defendant,
either actual or constructive, although such notice could be given after
the debtor's property had been attached.' 7
These common law principles were brought over to America by
the colonists.' 8 The idea of attaching a debtor's property flourished in
early America, where the division of the country into sovereign states,
with inhabitants easily able to travel from state to state, made attach-
ment proceedings almost a necessity. 19 With most of the country still
unexplored wilderness, debtors could simply flee, leaving their prop-
erty behind, to ensure that their creditors had no way of compelling
their appearance in court.2° With states enacting prejudgment or
attachment laws, a debtor's property was subject to attachment, thus
giving a court quasi in rem jurisdiction over the action and providing
creditors a forum to prosecute their claims.2
14. Charles Drake finds the first evidence of attachment of property in the ancient
records of the Chancery Courts of England, in 22 Edward IV. Id. This yearbook was
recorded in 1482-1483. See Y.B. 22 Edw. 4 (1482-1483), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF
THE REALM 468 (1377-1504).
15. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104 (1921).
16. Id. at 105.
17. See DRAKE, supra note 13, § 4 ("[lIt was declared by Lord Mansfield, that the
very essence of the custom is that the defendant shall not have notice."). Under
common law attachment, along with notice, the plaintiff was also required to post a
bond and give special reasons for the necessity of attaching the property. Id.
18. Id. § 3.
19. Id.
20. Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a
Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1990). Creditors
could not compel these fleeing debtors to appear in court due to the fact that there
could be no personal service of summons inside the state. Id. This is a result of the
"power" doctrine. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
21. Mushlin, supra note 20, at 1066.
2009]
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B. Pennoyer v. Neff- the "Power" Doctrine
The importance and necessity of attaching property in order to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction in early America was due, in most
part, to the "power" doctrine, articulated by the Supreme Court in Pen-
noyer v. Neff.22 Under this doctrine, a state, through its court system,
could only exercise jurisdiction over persons or property within its
own boundaries and, thus, under the "power" of the state.2 3 Accord-
ingly, a state court could not exercise in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident who had not been served with process while inside the
state unless he had consented to jurisdiction.24 Justice Fields, writing
22. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In
this case, a judgment of default was entered in an Oregon court against Neff, a
nonresident of Oregon, even though he was not personally served with process. Id. at
719-20. Instead, there was constructive service of summons by publication in the local
newspaper. Id. Neff's property located in Oregon was sold to satisfy the judgment
and eventually came into the hands of Pennoyer. Id. The question before the Court
was the validity of the judgment. Since Neff had not been personally served in Oregon
or consented to in personam jurisdiction, the lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the default judgment. Id. at 733-34. In addition, since the lower court did not attach
the property before entering judgment, the court had not obtained quasi in rem
jurisdiction. Id.
23. Although Pennoyer is best known for announcing the "power" doctrine, this
principle had been identified well before the case was decided. See Boswell's Lessee v.
Otis, 50 U.S. 336, 342 (1850) ("[A] court of chancery cannot take jurisdiction of a
person without personal service made on him within the jurisdiction of the court; but
provide[d] that, where land lies within the jurisdiction of the court, it may be acted
upon, and the title to it settled ... though one of the parties be a non-resident .... );
Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) ("Where a party is within a
territory, he may justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the
judgment pronounced .... Where he is not within such territory,... process by the
local laws may by attachment go to compel his appearance, and for his default to
appear, judgment may be pronounced against him.... [but] only to bind him to the
extent of such property .... "); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. 1786) ("It
appears by the pleadings, that the defendant was an inhabitant of the state of
Connecticut, and was not within the jurisdiction of the . . . county of Berkshire,
[Massachusetts] at the time of the pretended service of the writ; therefore, the court
had no legal jurisdiction of the cause .... "); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 37
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (per curiam) ("The defendant was not a resident of Massachusetts,
when the suit was commenced; his domicile was in [New York], and being in person
here, and not within the jurisdiction of the court of Massachusetts, he was not, and
could not have been served with process. The attachment of ... his property could
not bind him; it could only bind the goods attached, as a proceeding in rem .... "); see
also Joseph P. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 668, 668 n. 2 (1975).
24. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S at 733-34 ("[Flor any other purpose than to subject the
property of a non-resident to valid claims against him in the State, 'due process of law
6
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for the majority in Pennoyer, acknowledged, however, that this restric-
tion on in personam jurisdiction severely limited the ways in which a
citizen of a state could recover on his claims against a nonresident
debtor or, for that matter, a fleeing debtor.25 As such, the Court recog-
nized that property of a debtor located inside a state was nevertheless
within the power of the state courts and, thus, could be attached at the
commencement of an action to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction, even
when in personam jurisdiction could not be exercised.26 Therefore,
approval by the Court of attachment proceedings and quasi in rem
jurisdiction "constituted a partial escape from the strictures of the ter-
ritorial theory of jurisdiction. 27
As such, attachment proceedings, enabling a court to obtain quasi
in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, played a very impor-
tant role in early American jurisprudence. Under the "power" doc-
trine, due process required that a defendant be personally served with
process within a state before in personam jurisdiction could be exer-
cised over him.28 However, this requirement was eliminated when a
state was exercising its power over property within its boundaries to
satisfy the claims of a plaintiff.29 No longer could nonresidents or flee-
ing debtors avoid their liabilities by leaving a state and dodging per-
sonal service. As long as the debtor had property within the state, it
could be attached and a judgment, rendered in favor of the plaintiff,
could be executed against the attached property.
would require appearance or personal service [in-state] before the defendant could be
personally bound by any judgment rendered."').
25. Id. at 723 ("Every State owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-
residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority to hold and
appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to satisfy the claims of its
citizens.").
26. Id. at 733.
27. Zammit, supra note 23, at 670. The "power" doctrine was also referred to as
the territorial theory because if a person or property was not within the territory of the
state, then a court did not have the power to exercise jurisdiction over that person or
property.
28. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734.
29. Id. at 733. Service by publication was enough to satisfy due process when a
state was exercising its power over property to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id.
Thus, a plaintiff did not have to make any effort to give a property owner personal
notice that his property was being attached.
20091
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II. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Cases Affecting the Necessity of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
The power of the "power" doctrine slowly began to weaken by the
early 1900s. Court approval of motorist's consent statutes3 ° and stat-
utes allowing foreign corporations doing business in a state to be
served with process 31 stretched the limits of the Pennoyer holding.32
In 1945, the Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington33
forever changed jurisdictional law by expanding in personam jurisdic-
tion far beyond the limits of the "power" doctrine. Although Interna-
tional Shoe substantially changed the law with respect to in personam
jurisdiction, there still remained the question of what affect its holding
would have on Pennoyer's approval of attachment jurisdiction.34 This
question was finally answered in Shaffer v. Heitner,35 where the Court
held that the same analysis applied to the exercise of both in personam
and quasi in rem jurisdiction.3
1. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
The holding in International Shoe dramatically increased the
power of states to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents.37 The Court held that:
30. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (finding that a state may imply that a
nonresident driver using its highways has appointed a state official as his agent on
whom process may be served).
31. See Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914) ("[T]he
presence of a corporation within a state necessary to the service of process is shown
when it appears that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to
manifest its presence within the state .... "); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882)
(deciding that states could expressly state or imply a condition that a foreign
corporation doing business in a state must accept service of process on its agents
within the state).
32. See Zammit, supra note 23, at 673.
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This case will be discussed below. See infra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
34. See Mushlin, supra note 20, at 1070-73 (finding that most courts continued to
use quasi in rem jurisdiction after International Shoe in the same way permitted by the
Pennoyer holding, although most of the critics argued that the use of attachment to
obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresidents was, in most cases, unfair).
35. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). This case will be discussed below. See infra notes 42-50
and accompanying text.
36. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
37. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. The International Shoe Company had several
salesmen that were located within the state of Washington, but kept no office or
merchandise there. Id. at 313-14. International Shoe challenged Washington's
attempt to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. Id. at 313.
8
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[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'3 8
This holding switched the focus from the power of the state over the
defendant's person and property to the relationship between the two,
particularly the amount of contacts the defendant had with the state.
Thus, if a nonresident defendant had minimum contacts with a
state, measured by assessing the "quality and nature of the activity [in
the state] in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
law[," a court in that state could bind the defendant personally.
39
This expansive view of in personam jurisdiction led to the enactment
of long-arm statutes in every state in the country.4 ° These statutes
allowed states to take advantage of the International Shoe holding and
reach further to obtain jurisdiction over persons not within their geo-
graphical boundaries. 4 '
2. Shaffer v. Heitner
The question of what remained of the Pennoyer holding after
International Shoe was finally answered in Shaffer v. Heitner.4 2 The
The question before the Court was whether International Shoe, by its activities within
the state, had made itself amenable to proceedings in courts of that state. Id. at 311.
38. Id. at 316 (citation omitted). This rule will be referred to as the "minimum
contacts" test.
39. Id. at 319.
40. See Mushlin, supra note 20, at 1069 ("By the early 1960s this [expansion of
jurisdiction] culminated in every state having a long arm statute."); Zammit, supra
note 23, at 674 (noting that after the International Shoe decision, the "states soon
availed themselves of the 'minimum contacts' approach by enacting 'long-arm'
statutes").
41. For an in-depth discussion of long-arm statutes, see CASAD & RICHMAN, supra
note 7, §§ 4-1 to -9. North Carolina's long-arm statute was enacted in 1967. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007). The scope of this statute will be discussed below. See
infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
42. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In this case, a shareholder of a corporation filed a
shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware against the corporation, as well as former and
present officers and directors of the corporation. Id. at 189-90. The officers and
directors were all nonresidents of Delaware and the shareholder filed a motion to
sequester their Delaware property, which included stocks, options, and other
corporate rights of the defendants. Id. at 190-91. Under Delaware's sequestration
statute, which is modeled after attachment statutes, a defendant has the choice, after
his property has been sequestered, of entering a general appearance and subjecting
himself to in personam jurisdiction, or not appearing and suffering a default
judgment. Id. at 195 n.12.
20091
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issue before the Supreme Court was whether the standard of minimum
contacts set forth in International Shoe should be held to govern both
actions in personam and in rem.43 The Court answered this question
in the affirmative, holding that "all assertions of state-court jurisdic-
tion must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny. '44 In addition, the Court found that the
mere presence of property in a state, by itself, was not enough to meet
the minimum contacts standard.45 Thus, after Shaffer, in order for a
court to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching property, a
defendant must have sufficient contacts with the state, apart from his
property located inside the state, to satisfy the minimum contacts test
of International Shoe.46
The importance and necessity of attaching property to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction was greatly diminished by the holding in
Shaffer.47 With the expansion of in personam jurisdiction, quasi in
rem jurisdiction was unnecessary, in most cases, to bring nonresident
and fleeing debtors under the power of the court.48 If a nonresident
defendant has contacts with a state sufficient to allow a court to exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction, "the coexisting possibility of [quasi in
43. Id. at 206 ("It is clear, therefore, that the law of state-court jurisdiction no
longer stands securely on the foundation established in Pennoyer.").
44. Id. at 212. With this holding, Pennoyer v. Neff was overruled and with it, the
remnants of the "power" doctrine. Id. at 212 n.39.
45. Id. at 213 (finding that the defendants' Delaware property did not "provide
contacts with Delaware sufficient to support the jurisdiction of that State's courts
over" the defendants).
46. Id.
47. See Mushlin, supra note 20, at 1078 ("Shaffer confirmed the demise of
[existing] rationales for quasi in rem jurisdiction ....").
48. See id. Mushlin recognizes that the ability of a court exercising in personam
jurisdiction can be limited by a state's long-arm statute. Id. at 1090. If a nonresident
defendant has sufficient contacts to meet the standard set forth in International Shoe,
but is not covered by a state's long-arm statute, then the state cannot hear an action in
personam concerning the defendant. New York has used this gap between the
constitutional requirements of due process and a state's long-arm statute as an avenue
for justifying attachment jurisdiction after Shaffer. Id. at 1089-98 (discussing several
decisions from New York where courts have allowed the attachment of property to
obtain jurisdiction in cases where in personam jurisdiction could have been exercised
but for the long-arm statute). However, Mushlin finds that this "new" use of quasi in
rem jurisdiction is probably unconstitutional. Id. at 1105-11. Other commentators
have argued that the use of quasi in rem jurisdiction in such a circumstance would be
constitutional. See, e.g., Holly S. Haskew, Comment, Schaffer, Burnham, and New
York's Continuing Use of QIR-2 Jurisdiction: A Resurrection of the Power Theory, 45
EMORY L.J. 239 (1996).
566
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol31/iss3/6
No NOTICE, No HEARING, No PROBLEM?
rem] jurisdiction is at best superfluous. '4 9 However, the Court in
Shaffer found it unnecessary to answer the question of whether the
attachment of property, as a method of obtaining jurisdiction, violated
procedural due process.50 Accordingly, the following section will
address this question.
B. Cases Evaluating the Attachment of Property for Violations of
Procedural Due Process
Prejudgment statutes allow property to be attached without giving
the owner of the property notice of the attachment or a prior hear-
ing.51 As such, courts have questioned the validity of these statutes.
From 1969 to 1975, the Supreme Court had a chance to assess pre-
judgment statutes in several cases where challengers argued that the
statutes were unconstitutional because they violated procedural due
process. 52 However, since its decision in Shaffer, the Court has ana-
lyzed the validity of such statutes in only one case, Connecticut v.
Doehr.53 These decisions will be considered below, with the first four
discussed briefly and the last, Doehr, discussed in more detail since it
provides the most recent test for analyzing prejudgment statutes.
1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, the petitioner
alleged that a Wisconsin garnishment procedure violated procedural
due process by allowing the respondent to seize her wages without
notice and an opportunity to be heard.54 The Court acknowledged
that such a procedure might "meet the requirements of [procedural]
49. Zammit, supra note 23, at 676.
50. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189 (finding it unnecessary to address the appellant's
contention that Delaware's sequestration statute violated procedural due process
because the Court decided that it violated substantive due process by allowing
plaintiffs to attach property without a finding of minimum contacts).
51. In North Carolina, all that a plaintiff must do to attach property is post a bond,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.10 (2007), state the reasons for attaching the property in an
affidavit, id. § 1-440.11, and, of course, file the principal suit, the summons of which
can be sent well after the issuance of the writ of attachment, id. § 1-440.7.
52. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Although these cases did not
involve the attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction, which is the focus of this
Comment, they are helpful in setting up an analytical model to assess the
constitutional validity of prejudgment statutes.
53. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
54. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338.
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due process in extraordinary situations. '5 5 However, the Court held
that this case was not such an extraordinary situation.5 6 The peti-
tioner was a resident of Wisconsin and in personam jurisdiction could
have easily been obtained. 57 Thus, the Court concluded that the Wis-
consin statute providing for the garnishment of wages was
unconstitutional.58
2. Fuentes v. Shevin
In Fuentes v. Shevin,59 the Supreme Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania. 60 Both
statutes allowed for the seizure of a person's property, merely by an ex
parte application and the posting of a security bond, without the need
for notice to the possessor of the property or the right to a prior hear-
ing. 6' The Court began its analysis by noting that it was "fundamental
that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 62 Thus,
the question before the Court was whether the statutes had provided
notice and a hearing at a meaningful time;63 in other words, whether
procedural due process required notice and the opportunity for a hear-
ing prior to the seizure of property. The Court decided that the
requirements of each statute, calling for the plaintiff to post a bond
and make a conclusory allegation that he was entitled to the property,
55. Id. at 339. The Court cited several past decisions for this proposition,
including Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), which will be briefly discussed
below. See infra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
56. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 342 ("[Aibsent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment
procedure violates the fundamental principles of [procedural] due process." (citation
omitted)).
59. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60. Id. at 69. At common law, replevin was an action by a person, with a
preexisting interest in property, to have it returned after it had been wrongfully taken
or distrained. Id. at 78-79. Most of the appellants in the case bought property under
installment sales contracts, which gave them possession, but title was retained by the
seller. Id. at 71. When the appellants defaulted on their contracts, the sellers sought
writs of replevin in order to repossess the property. Id. at 70-72.
61. Id. at 69-70. Under both statutes, the defendant, the possessor of the property,
could post a bond to reclaim the property. Id. at 75-78. Under the Florida statue, the
defendant did eventually have the opportunity to be heard, at the action of
repossession required to be filed by the plaintiff in order to obtain the writ, while
under the Pennsylvania statue, the defendant did not have any opportunity to be heard
unless he filed a lawsuit himself. Id.
62. Id. at 80 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
63. Id.
568 [Vol. 31:557
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were hardly a proper substitute for notice and a hearing prior to the
seizure.64
The Court did note, however, that there were "extraordinary situa-
tions where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing [notice and a] hearing until after the event."' 65 The Court
identified three factors that were always present in extraordinary situa-
tions: the seizure of property was directly necessary to serve an impor-
tant governmental or public interest, there was a special need for
prompt action, and the government had strict control over the action. 6
6
One extraordinary situation identified was the attachment of property
to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction in state court, which the Court
acknowledged was "clearly a most basic and important public inter-
est."'67 Looking at the facts of the case, however, the Court decided
that, unlike a statute allowing for attachment of property to obtain
jurisdiction, the replevin statutes did not serve an important public
interest-rather they only furthered private gain. 6" Thus, the Court
decided that no extraordinary situation existed and held that the
replevin statutes violated procedural due process.69
3. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.
In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., the Supreme Court did not employ
the same reasoning that it had in Fuentes, where notice and a prior
hearing were necessary in the absence of exceptional circumstances, to
analyze Louisiana's sequestration statute. 7° Instead, a balancing test
was adopted, which analyzed the conflicting interests of the creditor
64. Id. at 81-83 ("[N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that
the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
occurred.").
65. Id. at 82 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
66. Id. at 91.
67. Id. at 91 n.23. The Court relied on Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), for
this proposition. The accuracy of this reliance will be discussed below. See infra notes
157-67 and accompanying text.
68. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 92.
69. Id. at 96-97.
70. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). In this case, Grant sold
Mitchell several household goods, but retained a vendor's lien on the goods in case
Mitchell did not continue to make payments. Id. at 601-02. When Mitchell failed to
pay the entire purchase price for the goods, Grant petitioned for a writ of
sequestration and this petition was granted by a Louisiana court, whereupon the
goods were taken into possession of the state. Id. at 602.
20091 569
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and the debtor. 71 The Court first noted that both parties had a present
interest in the seized property-in that the debtor had the right to pos-
session of the goods subject to the vendor's lien held by the creditor-
and, thus, "[r]esolution of the due process question [had to] take [into]
account not only ... the interests of the buyer of the property but those
of the seller as well. ' 72 The Court decided that the interests of a credi-
tor with a vendor's lien were adequately protected by allowing the
property to be sequestered and by requiring the buyer to post a bond
in order to recover the goods prior to any hearing.73
With respect to the debtor's side of the balancing test, the Court
decided that there were sufficient procedural safeguards in place to
protect the debtor's interests, protections not present in Fuentes.74 The
Louisiana sequestration statute required that a creditor state specific
facts in an affidavit clearly showing why the property should be
sequestered.75 In addition, the affidavit had to be made to a judge76
and the creditor had to post a bond before the writ could be issued.77
After the property had been sequestered, the debtor was entitled to an
immediate hearing where the creditor had to prove the grounds stated
in the affidavit.78 With all of these procedural safeguards, the Court
decided that the Louisiana procedure "protect[ed] the debtor's interest
in every conceivable way, [besides] allowing him to have the property
to start with," and, thus, the Court held that the procedure did not
violate procedural due process.79
71. Id. at 604. Sequestration statues, similar to prejudgment or attachment
statutes, allow property to be seized simply upon an ex parte application, without
notice or a prior hearing to the property owner. Id. at 606.
72. Id. at 604.
73. Id. at 607-09.
74. Id. at 615-18.
75. Id. at 605. In Fuentes, the creditor only had to make conclusory allegations
stating that he was entitled to the property. Id. at 615-17.
76. Id. at 606. In Fuentes, the writ of replevin was issued by a clerk of the court
instead of a judge. Id. at 615.
77. Id. at 606. A bond requirement was also present in Fuentes.
78. Id. The right to an immediate hearing was not present in Fuentes. Id. at 615-
16. In addition to an immediate hearing, the Louisiana statute allowed the debtor to
post a bond to reclaim the seized property, similar to the statutes in Fuentes. Id. at
607.
79. Id. at 618-20.
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4. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,8 the Court used
the same balancing test employed in Mitchell, but in this case, decided
that there were not adequate safeguards in place to protect the debtor's
interests.8 1 Specifically, the Georgia garnishment statute in question
was very similar to those invalidated in Fuentes and had none of the
"saving characteristics" identified by the Court in Mitchell.82 In order
for the writ to be issued, the creditor only had to post a bond and file
an affidavit that contained conclusory allegations, not specific facts.83
Additionally, the writ could be issued by the clerk of court, without
any participation by a judge.84 After the writ was issued, the debtor
did not have the right to an immediate hearing, but could only post a
bond to reclaim the property.8 5 Thus, since the Georgia statute lacked
the saving characteristics recognized in Mitchell, the Court held that it
violated procedural due process.
86
5. Connecticut v. Doehr
Connecticut v. Doehr8 7 is the only Supreme Court case assessing
the validity of prejudgment statutes since Shaffer. Although the case
does not involve the attachment of property to obtain quasi in rem
jurisdiction, its opinion serves as the current test for analyzing pre-
judgment statutes with regard to violations of procedural due process.
In Doehr, the petitioner, contemporaneous with filing a civil action for
assault and battery against the respondent, submitted an application
for a writ of attachment seeking to attach the respondent's real prop-
erty.88 Under Connecticut's prejudgment statute, real property could
be attached if a plaintiff submitted an affidavit stating that there was
probable cause to believe that his claim was valid.8 9 There was no
80. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). The petitioner, in
this case, challenged a Georgia wage garnishment statute that allowed his wages to be
garnished without notice or a prior hearing. Id. at 604.
81. Id. at 607-08.
82. Id. at 607. The saving characteristics recognized by the Court were: an
affidavit requiring specific facts and allegations; participation by a judicial officer; and
a right to an immediate post-deprivation hearing. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 608.
87. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
88. Id. at 5. The civil action did not involve the respondent's real property, and the
plaintiff did not have a preexisting interest in the defendant's real property. Id.
89. Id.
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requirement that the plaintiff post a bond before the writ was issued.90
Shortly after the writ attaching the respondent's property was issued,
the respondent filed suit in federal court alleging that the prejudgment
attachment violated procedural due process in that it provided no
notice or hearing prior to the deprivation of his property.91
The question before the Court was "what process must be
afforded by a state statute enabling an individual to enlist the aid of
the State to deprive another of his or her property by means of the
prejudgment attachment."92 To answer this question, the Court modi-
fied its test from Mathews v. Elderigde, a threefold inquiry used by the
Court to determine what process is due when the government seeks to
deprive a person of his property on its own initiative.93 Thus, by mod-
ifying the Mathews test, the Court, in Doehr, announced a new test to
analyze prejudgment statutes under procedural due process, which
read:
[Tihe relevant inquiry requires, as in Mathews, first, consideration of
the private interest that will be affected by the prejudgment measure;
second, an examination of the risk of erroneous deprivation through
the procedures under attack and the probable value of additional or
alternative safeguards; and third, in contrast to Mathews, principal
attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy,
with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government
may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of
providing greater protections. 94
The first inquiry in this test is a consideration of the interest that
will be affected by the prejudgment attachment. 95 Stated another way,
a court must determine whether the property attached is sufficient to
necessitate protection under the Constitution. This prong will always
weigh against the validity of a prejudgment statute when a person's
property, real or personal, has been attached. The Court stated that
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id. The district court upheld the prejudgment statute, but the Second Circuit
reversed on appeal, holding that the statute violated procedural due process. Id. at 7-
8.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Mathews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The third prong of the Mathews
test looks at "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail." Id. at 335. This prong had to be modified in Doehr, because with
prejudgment statutes, the dispute is between private parties and not an individual and
the government. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11.
94. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11. For purposes of this Comment, this test will be
referred to as the "modified Mathews test."
95. Id.
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"our cases show that even the temporary or partial impairments to
property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances
entail are sufficient to merit due process protection."96
The second inquiry in the modified Mathews test examines the
risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards.9"
The Court decided that there was a substantial risk of erroneous dep-
rivation under Connecticut's prejudgment statute.98 Like the garnish-
ment statute in North Georgia, the statute failed to have the saving
characteristics recognized by the Court in Mitchell.9 9 First, a writ of
attachment would be issued if the plaintiff made only conclusory state-
ments alleging that there was probable cause to believe that his claim
was valid.'00 Second, the plaintiff was not required to post a bond
before the writ was issued.10' Lastly, unlike in Mitchell, the plaintiff
did not have a preexisting interest in the property.'0 2 Connecticut's
prejudgment statute did allow for an immediate hearing after the
attachment of the property and a double damages action if the initial
suit was brought without probable cause, but the Court found that
these safeguards, alone, "would not cure the temporary deprivation
that an earlier hearing might have prevented.'
10 3
The third inquiry in the modified Mathews test considers the
interests of the party seeking the order of attachment.'0 4 The Court
decided that the petitioner's interests were too minimal to allow pre-
judgment attachment of the respondent's property. l05 The petitioner
did not have a preexisting interest in the property at the time the
attachment was sought.'0 6 In addition, the petitioner did not allege
that the respondent was about to transfer or encumber the property,
which the Court noted would be "an exigent circumstance permitting
postponing any notice or hearing until after the attachment is
effected."' 0 7 Without a preexisting interest in the property or exigent
96. Id. at 12.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 12-15.
100. Id. at 13-14.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 14-15.
104. Id. at 16.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Three of the cases discussed above had previously identified this as an
exigent or exceptional circumstance that would justify postponing notice or a hearing.
See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
57320091
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circumstances, the Court decided that the petitioner's interest did not
justify the attachment of the respondent's property. 10 8
Weighing each of the three inquiries of the modified Mathews test
against each other, the Court held that the Connecticut statute violated
procedural due process.' 0 9 The first inquiry revealed that an impor-
tant property interest, one protected by the Constitution, had been
attached. Under the second inquiry, the Court determined that the
statute lacked sufficient procedural safeguards and, thus, the risk of
erroneous deprivation was substantial. Finally, the Court decided that
the petitioner's interests in attaching the property were minimal, since
he did not claim to have a preexisting interest in the property or allege
that any exigent circumstances existed.
III. ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S PREJUDGMENT STATUTE
North Carolina's prejudgment statutes were enacted in 1947, two
years after the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe, but
prior to its decision in Shaffer." As such, the exercise of quasi in rem
jurisdiction was still governed by the principles set forth in Pennoyer,
which allowed attachment as a form of relief from the strict require-
ments of the "power" doctrine."1 ' This is evident from the grounds for
attachment provided for in the prejudgment attachment statute." 2
Section 1-440.3 provides,
In those actions in which attachment may be had under the provisions
of [section] 1-440.2, an order of attachment may be issued when the
defendant is
(1) A nonresident, or
(2) A foreign corporation, or
(3) A domestic corporation, whose president, vice-president, sec-
retary or treasurer cannot be found in the State after due dili-
gence, or
67, 90-92 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 339
(1969).
108. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 16. This inquiry also looks at the government's ancillary
interest in providing the attachment remedy. Id. However, the Court found that the
government's interest in providing the remedy for the petitioner could not be any
greater than the interests that the petitioner had in the attachment. Id. Since the
petitioner's interests were minimal, so too were the government's. Id.
109. Id. at 24.
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3 (2007); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977);
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
111. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3.
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(4) A resident of the State who, with intent to defraud his credi-
tors or to avoid service of summons,
a. Has departed, or is about to depart, from the State, or
b. Keeps himself concealed therein, or
(5) A person or domestic corporation which, with intent to
defraud his or its creditors,
a. Has removed, or is about to remove, property from this
State, or
b. Has assigned, disposed of, or secreted, or is about to
assign, dispose of, or secrete, property.
1 13
The first four grounds for attachment are clearly based on the
antiquated principles of Pennoyer, permitting attachment of property
to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction
cannot be obtained. For example, the statute provides that when a
domestic corporation cannot be served inside the state1 14 or a resident
of the state is "dodging" servicell 5 -both circumstances precluding
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction under Pennoyer-a plaintiff is
afforded some relief by creating a method of obtaining jurisdiction." 6
The fifth ground for attachment, on the other hand, does not merely
provide a basis for obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction. It allows a
plaintiff to attach the defendant's property to secure the property and
prevent its destruction or disposal prior to a lawsuit.'
1 7
In order to determine whether North Carolina's prejudgment
attachment statute violates procedural due process, each ground for
attachment must be analyzed separately to see if it passes constitu-
tional muster. To facilitate this analysis, North Carolina's long-arm
statute will be briefly discussed to determine its scope with respect to
the limits of due process set forth in International Shoe. Next, the
three-pronged modified Mathews test will be applied to the statute, tak-
ing into consideration the scope of the long-arm statute and its affect
on each ground for attachment.
A. In Personam Jurisdiction in North Carolina: The Long-Arm Statute
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that a court in
North Carolina must make a "two-fold determination" before exercis-
ing in personam jurisdiction over a defendant: first, the court must
determine whether the long-arm statute permits the court to exercise
113. Id.
114. See id. § 1-440.3(3).
115. See id. § 1-440.3(4).
116. Id. § 1-440.3.
117. See id. § 1-440.3(5).
5752009]
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such jurisdiction, and, if so, the court must determine whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process.'B Therefore, before
a court turns to its "minimum contacts" analysis under International
Shoe, it must determine whether the legislature has authorized the
exercise of in personam jurisdiction according to the facts of the par-
ticular case.
North Carolina's long-arm statute is section 1-75.4 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. 1 9 The statute lists twelve specifically
defined circumstances in which a North Carolina court can exercise in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant. 1 20 Thus, to satisfy the first
inquiry in the "two-fold determination," a court must find that the
defendant's contacts with the state are such that they fit within one of
the specifically defined circumstances in the statute. Although it
would seem that the specificity of the long-arm statute would serve to
limit the state's power to exercise in personam jurisdiction, North Car-
olina courts have interpreted the statute as a "legislative attempt to
assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the full
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause."'' This interpretation
118. Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (N.C. 1977). The
second determination is, of course, whether such an exercise of jurisdiction will
violate due process. Id.
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007).
120. The twelve different circumstances are: (1) local presence or status within the
state; (2) where jurisdiction is conferred by another statute; (3) local act or omission
that has resulted in an injury; (4) local injury arising from an act or omission
occurring outside the state; (5) actions arising from local services, goods or contracts;
(6) actions arising out of local property; (7) deficiency judgments on local
foreclosures; (8) defendant is a director or officer of a domestic corporation; (9)
actions arising from taxes levied by the state; (10) actions arising from local insurance
contracts; (11) personal representatives of a decedent who would be subject to
jurisdiction if living; and (12) actions arising from marital relationships where either
party lives locally. Id.
121. Sparrow v. Goodman, 376 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (quoting
First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. McDaniel, 197 S.E.2d 556, 558 (N.C. Ct. App.
1973)). See also Dillon, 231 S.E.2d at 630 ("[lIt is apparent that the General Assembly
intended to make available to the North Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers
permissible under federal due process."); Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 208 S.E.2d 676,
679 (N.C. 1974) ("State legislatures have responded to these expanding notions of due
process with 'long-arm' legislation designed to. . . make available to the courts of their
states the full jurisdictional powers permissible under due process .... [T]he North
Carolina General Statutes reflect this national approach to personal jurisdiction.").
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has resulted in the long-arm statute being "liberally construed in favor
of finding personal jurisdiction."'122
While each circumstance defined in the long-arm statute has been
liberally construed, section 1-75.4(1)(d) has received the broadest
interpretation.' 23 This subsection allows for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over any defendant who is "engaged in substantial activity within
this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or oth-
erwise. ''1 24 The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Dillon v. Numis-
matic Funding Corp., stated that, by the enactment of section 1-
75.4(1)(d), the legislature "intended to make available to the North
Carolina courts the full jurisdictional powers permissible under fed-
eral due process. '"125
Referencing this statement in Dillon, courts throughout the state
have continuously utilized section 1-75.4(1)(d) to find statutory
authorization for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 126 In fact,
many courts have concluded that, in light of the broad interpretation
of this particular subsection, statutory authority to exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction impliedly follows a finding of minimum contacts,
and have, therefore, skipped the initial determination of whether the
long-arm statute applies.1 27 Accordingly, the established law in North
122. Telerant Leasing Corp. v. Equity Assocs. Inc., 245 S.E.2d 229, 233 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1978) (quoting Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 225 S.E.2d 137, 140 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 231 S.E.2d 629 (N.C. 1977)).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
124. Id. Although the language "substantial activity" has been liberally construed,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina has stated that the statute requires that the
defendant have some "activity" in the state. Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 638 S.E.2d
203 (N.C. 2006). However, it seems apparent that minimum contacts with the state
are enough to satisfy the substantial activity requirement.
125. Dillon, 231 S.E.2d at 630-31 ("[Section] 1-75.4(1)(d) ... statutorily[ I grants
the courts of North Carolina the opportunity to exercise jurisdiction over defendant to
the extent allowed by due process.").
126. See, e.g., A.R. Haire, Inc. v. St. Denis, 625 S.E.2d 894, 899 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006);
Guy M. Turner, Inc. v. Commercial Plant Relocators, Inc., No. COA01-597, 2002 WL
857429, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. May 7, 2002); Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co.,
532 S.E.2d 215, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Bullard v. USAir, Inc., 443 S.E.2d 80, 82
(N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 273 S.E.2d 509, 511 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1981); H. V. Allen Co., Inc. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 768, 770 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980); Paris v. Garner Commercial Disposal, Inc., 253 S.E.2d 29, 34 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979).
127. See Murphy v. Glafenhein, 431 S.E.2d 241, 244 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("[Wlhen
personal jurisdiction is alleged to exist pursuant to Section 1-75.4(1)(d), the question
of statutory authorization collapses into the question of whether [the defendant] has
the minimum contacts with North Carolina necessary to meet the requirements of due
process." (second alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks
20091
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Carolina presumes statutory authorization to exercise in personam
jurisdiction.128
B. Analyzing North Carolina's Prejudgment Attachment Statute
Under the Modified Mathews Test
The constitutionality of North Carolina's prejudgment attachment
statute has not been examined since the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Shaffer and Doehr.129 The statute was held to be
constitutional in Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina,130 but this deci-
sion was in 1975, when the prevailing test under procedural due pro-
cess was whether the statutes contained the saving characteristics of
Mitchell. Accordingly, North Carolina's prejudgment attachment stat-
ute must be re-evaluated in light of the new modified Mathews test.
The Hutchinson decision, however, will be discussed because its analy-
sis is helpful in examining the second inquiry in the modified Mathews
test.
1. Inquiry #1- the Interest Affected by the Attachment
The first inquiry in the modified Mathews test seeks to determine
whether the interest affected by the attachment would be afforded con-
stitutional protection. If the interest is constitutionally protected, then
this factor weighs against the attachment of the property. According to
omitted)); Kaplan Sch. Supply Corp. v. Henry Wurst, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 607, 609 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1982) ("Since the requisite statutory authorization for personal jurisdiction is
coextensive with federal due process, the critical inquiry in determining whether
North Carolina may assert in personam jurisdiction over a defendant is whether the
assertion thereof comports with due process.").
128. See Gen. Latex & Chem. Corp. (of N.C.) v. Phoenix Med. Tech., Inc., 765 F.
Supp. 1246, 1249 n.1 (W.D.N.C. 1991) ("Thus, given the liberal construction of the
North Carolina long-arm statute, the prevailing law in North Carolina presumes the
existence of in personam jurisdiction.").
129. Immediately after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals applied its holding to part of North Carolina's long-
arm statute in Balcon v. Sadler, 244 S.E.2d 164 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). Under one
subsection of the long-arm statute, section 1-75.8(4), a North Carolina court could
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over an action if the defendant had property in the
state that had been attached, id. The court concluded that this subsection was
unconstitutional since it allowed for the exercise of jurisdiction merely from a showing
that the defendant owned property in the state, which was in direct contravention with
Shaffer's requirement of minimum contacts. Balcon, 244 S.E.2d at 167. The court
found, however, that quasi in rem jurisdiction could still be exercised over
nonresidents under the next subsection, section 1-75.8(4), which extends quasi in rem
jurisdiction to any action in which it may be constitutionally exercised, id.
130. Hutchinson v. Bank of N.C., 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
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section 1-440.4 of North Carolina's prejudgment statutes, all of a
defendant's property located in the state is subject to attachment. 1 31
The term property, under the statute, has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina to include any type of property
interest, no matter whether it is "real or personal, tangible or intangi-
ble."' 13 2 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has construed
the Due Process Clause broadly to protect "any significant property
interest."'133 These significant property interests include mere tempo-
rary invasions of property rights and, as such, state attachment proce-
dures must be subject to the strict limitations of procedural due
process.134 Since North Carolina's prejudgment statutes allow for the
attachment of significant property interests-which are clearly pro-
tected under the Constitution-this inquiry would weigh against the
constitutionality of the attachment statute.
2. Inquiry #2- the Risk of Erroneous Deprivation Based on the
Safeguards in Place
The second inquiry of the modified Mathews test analyzes the risk
of erroneous deprivation by looking at the safeguards the state has put
in place to protect the person whose property is being attached. The
United States Supreme Court has looked to the "saving characteristics"
that it identified in Mitchell to determine whether there are sufficient
safeguards in place. In evaluating North Carolina's prejudgment
attachment statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina will be relied upon because it
analyzed North Carolina's statutes under the Mitchell balancing test. 1
35
The issue before the court in Hutchinson was whether North Caro-
lina's prejudgment statutes contained any or all of the saving charac-
teristics found in Mitchell.' 36 The state court first acknowledged that
the statutes required that a plaintiff articulate specific allegations and
grounds in an affidavit before a writ of attachment could be issued, a
requirement that the court decided "involve[d] a stronger showing"
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.4 (2007).
132. Newberry v. Meadows Fertilizer Co., 166 S.E. 79, 82 (N.C. 1932) ("[A]Il
property in this state, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible, owned by a
nonresident defendant in an action to recover on any of the causes of action included
within the provisions of [the prejudgment statute], is liable to attachment.").
133. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
134. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991).
135. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. 888.
136. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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than the Louisiana statute analyzed in Mitchell.'37 Moreover, the court
noted that a plaintiff was required to post a bond in order for the writ
to be issued, 138 and if such a writ was issued, the defendant was enti-
tled to an immediate post-deprivation hearing to determine the validity
of the attachment.
13 9
The court did identify one issue that made it question whether all
of the saving characteristics of Mitchell were present. Under North
Carolina law, a writ of attachment can be issued by a judge or the clerk
of court.140 This lack of judicial supervision was one of the main fac-
tors that the United States Supreme Court focused on in North Georgia
to hold Georgia's garnishment statute unconstitutional. 14 ' The court
in Hutchinson, however, determined that this aspect of the prejudg-
ment statutes did not render them unconstitutional. 142
Looking at the present law and practice in North Carolina, the
court found it "abundantly clear that the Clerk of Superior Court is a
judicial officer and not a mere administrative functionary.' 1 43 This
statement was further supported, the court concluded, by the fact that
the clerk of court was authorized by the legislature to hear a motion for
the dissolution of the writ of attachment, an adversarial hearing.144 By
establishing that the clerk of court was a judicial officer for the pur-
pose of issuing and dissolving a writ of attachment, the court satisfied
the last of the saving characteristics of Mitchell.' 45 Thus, the court
137. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 895-96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.11 (2007)
(requiring that a plaintiff in every case to state by affidavit that he has commenced or
is about to commence an action, the nature of the action, and the specific grounds for
the attachment of the property).
138. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 897. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.10 (requiring the
plaintiff to furnish a bond in an amount deemed necessary by the court to ensure
reasonable protection of the defendant).
139. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 897. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.36 (allowing the
defendant to move for dissolution of the order of attachment at any time before final
judgment in the principal action).
140. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.5.
141. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
142. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 896-97.
143. Id. at 896. The court cited several other North Carolina statutes in which the
clerk of court is granted judicial powers. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-474(a) (empowering
the clerk of court to order the seizure of property and defining this power as a "judicial
act [that] may be appealed"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-40 (2007) (acknowledging that the
clerk of court, in exercising the judicial power conferred upon him in certain
situations, is a judicial officer of the Superior Court Division).
144. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 896. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.36.
145. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 897.
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held that North Carolina's prejudgment statute did not violate proce-
dural due process.146
Accordingly, the North Carolina prejudgment statutes arguably
have all of the saving characteristics of Mitchell: the plaintiff must sub-
mit an affidavit stating specific allegations and grounds for attachment
of the property147 to a judicial officer,' 48 post a bond,149 and the
defendant has the right to an immediate post-deprivation hearing to
assess the validity of the attachment.' 50 Because of these procedural
safeguards, the risk of erroneous deprivation is reduced significantly.
Accordingly, this inquiry weighs towards the constitutionality of the
attachment statute.
3. Inquiry #3- the Plaintiffs Interests in Attaching the Property
The third inquiry in the modified Mathews test evaluates the inter-
ests of the person seeking the writ of attachment. If this person's inter-
ests are minimal, this inquiry would weigh against the
constitutionality of North Carolina's prejudgment attachment statute.
The Supreme Court has identified two instances in which a plaintiff
would have an interest in seeking attachment of property such that
this inquiry would weigh in favor of the constitutionality of an attach-
ment statute: when the plaintiff has a preexisting interest in the prop-
erty and when exigent circumstances exist.' 5 ' The following analysis
assumes that the plaintiff seeking attachment does not have a preexist-
ing interest in the property-the typical scenario in jurisdictional
attachment cases. 152 Thus, in order for the plaintiff to have a sufficient
interest, it must be shown that exigent circumstances exist.
146. Id. at 899. The court also determined that there was no need to find that the
plaintiff had a preexisting interest in the property that he was seeking to attach. Id. at
898. The court decided that, although Mitchell emphasized the plaintiffs preexisting
interest, the United States Supreme Court in North Georgia did not discuss this factor,
finding the garnishment statute unconstitutional due to other factors. Id.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.11.
148. Id. § 1-440.5. The court, in Hutchinson, found that in North Carolina the clerk
of court is a judicial officer. Hutchinson, 392 F. Supp. at 896-97. The Author of this
Comment would agree that, in the exercise of issuing an order of attachment, the clerk
of court is given judicial powers by the legislature. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-40
(stating that the clerk of court, in exercising the judicial power conferred upon him in
certain situations, is a judicial officer of the Superior Court Division).
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.10.
150. Id. § 1-440.36.
151. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1991).
152. See Zammit, supra note 23, at 679 ("In the typical case of jurisdictional
attachment, the attaching plaintiff has no preexisting interest in the seized property
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The first four grounds for attachment under North Carolina's pre-
judgment attachment statute allow for property to be attached in order
for a court to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant. 153
More specifically, they provide for attachment when the defendant is a
nonresident, a foreign corporation, or a resident or domestic corpora-
tion that is avoiding personal service of summons. 154 While each of
these grounds must be analyzed separately, they do raise a common
issue: whether the attachment of property merely to obtain quasi in
rem jurisdiction constitutes an exigent circumstance.
In Fuentes, the Supreme Court recognized that there were a few
exceptional circumstances that justified postponing notice and a hear-
ing, and in each situation, the seizure of property must have been nec-
essary to secure an important public interest. 155  One of the
exceptional circumstances identified was the attachment of property
to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction, which the Court noted was "a most
basic and important public interest."' 56 The Court relied on Ownbey
v. Morgan157 for this principle, a case which was decided in 1921, well
before the Court's decisions in International Shoe and Shaffer. In sub-
sequent decisions, the Supreme Court continued to cite to Ownbey for
the proposition that the attachment of property in order to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction constituted an exigent circumstance. 58
Prior to the Court's decision in Shaffer, this reliance seemed perfectly
justified. At the time Ownbey was decided, the "power" doctrine con-
trolled jurisdictional law. As a result, the ability to attach property
located in a state in order to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant was of the utmost importance. Under the "power" doctrine,
attachment of property was absolutely necessary to protect the impor-
.... "). Thus, the focus of this analysis will be on the second type of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. See discussion supra note 7.
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(1)-(4).
154. Id.
155. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972). The Court also recognized two
other factors that were always present for a finding of exigent circumstances. Id. See
supra text accompanying note 68.
156. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91 n.23.
157. 256 U.S. 94 (1921). The question before the Court was whether conditioning
the opportunity for a hearing on the owner of attached property posting a security bail
comported with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 102-03. The Court
concluded that such a condition was essential to convert a quasi in rem action into an
action in personam, especially in light of the "power" doctrine of Pennoyer, and thus
did not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 110-12.
158. See N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 610 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 n.13
(1974); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 613 (1974).
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tant public interest in adjudicating creditor's claims over nonresident
or fleeing debtors that could not be personally served with process in-
state. Even after International Shoe introduced its minimum contacts
test for establishing in personam jurisdiction, 159 the attachment of
property still seemed necessary in order to obtain jurisdiction over
defendants that did not have sufficient contacts with a state.
The Supreme Court's holding in Shaffer, however, placed in per-
sonam and quasi in rem jurisdiction on the same footing by requiring
that the minimum contacts test be satisfied in order to exercise juris-
diction in either form. 160  Therefore, according to constitutional
requirements and ignoring a state's long-arm statute, if quasi in rem
jurisdiction could be exercised over a defendant, so could in personam
jurisdiction. 16 1 Thus, Shaffer's holding brought into question the
Court's earlier reliance on Ownbey. In fact, the Shaffer Court
expressly addressed that reliance stating that "[w]e do not read the
recent references to Ownbey as necessarily suggesting that Ownbey is
consistent with more recent decisions interpreting the Due Process
Clause."'162 In light of Shaffer, one must ask the following question:
what important public interest is served by attaching property, with-
out notice or a prior hearing to the property owner, solely to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction when in personam jurisdiction is available to
the courts? The answer is clear. When in personam jurisdiction is
available, there is no interest that would justify postponing notice and
a hearing.' 63 If an important public interest is not secured by the
attachment of property, then one of the factors required for a finding
of exigent circumstances is not satisfied.
Looking at the third inquiry of the modified Mathews test directly,
one can ask: what interest does a plaintiff have in attaching the defen-
dant's property when a state court can exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion over the defendant? Except in those situations where a plaintiff is
seeking attachment to secure property from disposal or destruction
under the fifth ground for attachment, 64 the only reason for the plain-
159. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
160. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
161. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
162. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 194 n.10. See also Zammit, supra note 23, at 680 (arguing
that, prior to the Court's decision in Shaffer, reliance on Ownbey was misplaced).
163. See Zammit, supra note 23, at 680-81 (arguing that attachment was not an
important public interest when the "public interest in adjudicating a particular
controversy [could] be fully secured through the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction").
164. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(5) (2007).
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tiff to attach property, alleging one of the first four grounds for attach-
ment, is to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. Since a post-Shaffer
plaintiff must show that a defendant has minimum contacts with a
state before in personam or quasi in rem jurisdiction can be constitu-
tionally exercised,' 65 the only potential scenario in which a plaintiff
would have any interest in attaching property is if, under the specific
circumstances of the case, the North Carolina long-arm statute' 66
restricted the court's power to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant. In such cases, a plaintiff would be unable to obtain a judg-
ment against a defendant in North Carolina unless the attachment of
property, giving a state court quasi in rem jurisdiction, was permitted.
Accordingly, each of the grounds for attachment will be analyzed
below to determine whether a plaintiff, seeking attachment under each
ground, has a sufficient interest to support the attachment. If, for each
of the first four grounds for attachment, in personam jurisdiction can
be exercised under the long-arm statute, then the plaintiff's interest in
attaching the property would be de minimis. On the other hand, if the
long-arm statute does not authorize the exercise of in personam juris-
diction over the defendant, the plaintiffs interest in attaching the prop-
erty to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction would be substantial. 167 In
such circumstances, the earlier justifications for allowing the attach-
ment of property under the "power" doctrine would still be applicable.
Thus, where a state court cannot obtain in personam jurisdiction over
a defendant due to statutory restrictions, the important public interest
in providing a means by which a plaintiff can secure a judgment
against a nonresident defendant would create an exigent circumstance
allowing for attachment of the property.
a. The First Ground for Attachment-Section 1-440.3(1)
The first ground for attachment provides that "an order of attach-
ment may be issued when the defendant is . .. [a] nonresident.' 168
Thus, in order to assess the plaintiffs interest in seeking attachment,
one must determine whether North Carolina's long-arm statute
restricts the power of state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction
165. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2007).
167. Contra Mushlin, supra note 20, at 1104-16 (arguing that attachment of
property to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction, even in this circumstance, is probably
unconstitutional). But see Haskew, supra note 48, at 266-78 (arguing that Mushlin's
analysis is incorrect and that quasi in rem jurisdiction should be available to the
courts when a state's long-arm statute limits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(1).
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over a nonresident. The liberal interpretation of North Carolina's long-
arm statute, as discussed earlier, clearly extends the power of a court
to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to
the limits of due process. Accordingly, if a plaintiff can establish that
the defendant has minimum contacts with North Carolina, a state
court will have the power to render a personal judgment against the
defendant. With this power over a nonresident defendant available,
the plaintiffs interest in attaching the defendant's property to obtain
jurisdiction would be nonexistent. Therefore, the first ground for
attachment weighs in favor of finding the attachment statute
unconstitutional.
b. The Second Ground for Attachment-Section 1-440.3(2)
The second ground for attachment provides that "an order of
attachment may be issued when the defendant is ... [a] foreign corpo-
ration. ' 169 The broad interpretation of North Carolina's long-arm stat-
ute which applies to nonresident defendants is also applicable to
foreign corporations. 170 Therefore, regardless of whether the statute is
conferring jurisdiction over a nonresident or a foreign corporation, it
is liberally construed to grant state courts the power to exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Accordingly, once a
plaintiff can establish that a foreign corporation has minimum con-
tacts with North Carolina, giving a court the power to exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction, his interest in attaching the corporation's property
to obtain jurisdiction would be de minimis. As such, the second
ground for attachment weighs in favor of finding the attachment stat-
ute unconstitutional.
c. The Third Ground for Attachment- Section 1-440.3(3)
The third ground for attachment provides that "an order of attach-
ment may be issued when the defendant is . . . [a] domestic corpora-
tion, whose president, vice-president, secretary or treasurer cannot be
found in the State after due diligence." '171 North Carolina's long-arm
statute expressly provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over a "party
who when service of process is made . . . [ius a domestic corpora-
169. Id. § 1-440.3(2). For purposes of the statute, a foreign corporation refers not
only to an international corporation but also to a corporation that is incorporated in a
state other than North Carolina.
170. See Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 218 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying section 1-75.4(1)(d) to find statutory authorization to exercise
in personam jurisdiction over a defendant corporation).
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(3).
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tion. '' 171 Service of process, of course, can be served upon a domestic
corporation regardless of whether a president, vice president, secre-
tary, or treasurer can be found in North Carolina. 173 Once such ser-
vice of process is made, in personam jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation will always be available to the courts. Thus, the third
ground for attachment weighs in favor of finding the attachment stat-
ute unconstitutional.
d. The Fourth Ground for Attachment- Section 1-440.3(4)
The fourth ground for attachment provides that "an order of
attachment may be issued when the defendant is ... [a] resident of the
State who, with intent to defraud his creditors or to avoid service of
summons, . . . [h]as departed, or is about to depart, from the State, or
... [k]eeps himself concealed therein."' 74 Unlike with domestic cor-
porations, the long-arm statute does not expressly provide for the exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction over residents of the state. Section 1-
75.4(1)(b) does allow for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person
domiciled within the state, 175 but the terms "residence" and "domicile"
are not interchangeable. Residence refers to a "person's actual place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary," whereas a person is domi-
ciled in a place if it is his residence and he "inten[ds] to make. . . [his]
residence a home." 176 Thus, while most residents of North Carolina
are also domiciled in the state, not all residents will be covered by that
particular subsection.
However, in personam jurisdiction over residents of the state,
whose place of domicile is located elsewhere, can still be exercised
under section 1-75.4(1)(d). 177 Since this section has been interpreted
as giving state courts full jurisdictional powers, a North Carolina court
will be authorized to exercise in personam jurisdiction over any resi-
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1)(c) (2007).
173. Service of process upon a domestic corporation can be made in several ways,
besides personally serving an officer or director of the corporation. These include:
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint in the office of the corporation's officer
or director with the person who is in charge of the office; delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to an agent authorized to receive service of process; mailing a
copy of the summons and the complaint to the corporation's officer, director, or
authorized agent; or depositing the summons and complaint with a designated
delivery service to be delivered to the officer, director, or authorized agent. N.C. R.
Civ. P. 4(j)(6).
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(4).
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1)(b).
176. Vinson Realty Co. v. Honig, 362 S.E.2d 602, 603 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
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dent, although not domiciled in the state, that has minimum contacts
with the state. If the defendant is subject to in personam jurisdic-
tion,' 7 8 the plaintiffs interest in attaching a defendant's property to
obtain jurisdiction, similar to the other three grounds for attachment,
is nonexistent. Thus, the fourth ground for attachment weighs in favor
of finding the attachment statute unconstitutional.
e. The Fifth Ground for Attachment- Section 1-440.3(5)
The fifth ground for attachment provides that "an order of attach-
ment may be issued when the defendant.., with intent to defraud his
creditors or its creditors ... [h]as removed or is about to remove, prop-
erty from this State, or . . . [hias assigned, disposed of, or secreted, or
is about to assign, dispose of, or secrete, property."' 79 As indicated
above, this ground for attachment does not merely provide a basis for
obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction. Rather, it allows a plaintiff to
attach the defendant's property to secure it against destruction or dis-
posal prior to a lawsuit. The Supreme Court has held that this ground
constitutes an exigent circumstance.' 0 In Doehr, the Court stated
that exigent circumstances would exist when a plaintiff alleged that
the defendant was "about to transfer or encumber his real estate or
take any other action during the pendency of the action that would
render his real estate unavailable to satisfy a judgment."18" Thus, a
plaintiff seeking attachment under the fifth ground would have an
interest sufficient to allow prejudgment attachment of property.
Accordingly, this ground for attachment weighs in favor of finding the
attachment statute constitutional.
178. Although the resident may hide or leave the state to avoid personal service of
summons, North Carolina's Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the resident to be
served in other ways. For example, a plaintiff can: leave a copy of the summons and
complaint at the defendant's house or usual place of abode with someone of suitable
age; deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized to receive
service for the defendant; mail a copy of the summons and complaint; or use a
designated delivery service to deliver a copy of the summons and complaint. N.C. R.
Civ. P. 40)(6). In addition, if the defendant is unable to be served by these methods of
service, he may be served by publication. Id. at R. 4(j1) ("A party that cannot with
due diligence be served by personal delivery, registered or certified mail, or by a
designated delivery service . . . may be served by publication.").
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(5) (applying only when the defendant is a person or
domestic corporation).
180. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16 (1991).
181. Id.
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4. Balancing the Three Inquiries
The modified Mathews test requires a balancing of each of its
three inquiries, and, "[b]y weighing these concerns, courts can deter-
mine whether a State has met the 'fundamental requirement[s] of [pro-
cedural] due process. '  Under the first inquiry, it is clear that the
defendant has a substantial interest in the attached property. There-
fore, this inquiry weighs in favor of finding North Carolina's prejudg-
ment attachment statute unconstitutional. However, under the second
inquiry, the prejudgment statutes provide sufficient procedural safe-
guards-which reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. Accordingly,
this inquiry favors a finding of constitutionality.
The third inquiry turns on the determination of whether the
plaintiff has a sufficient interest in seeking attachment of the property.
The fifth ground for attachment provides for attachment when exigent
circumstances exist. As such, this inquiry would weigh in favor of
finding the attachment statute constitutional. Given the fact that
North Carolina's statutes also provides sufficient safeguards, a proper
balancing of all three inquiries leads to the conclusion that the attach-
ment of property under the fifth ground would not violate procedural
due process.
However, the first four grounds for attachment merely provide a
means for obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction. Since North Carolina's
long-arm statute has been construed so liberally, a plaintiffs interest
in seeking attachment under these grounds is de minimus or nonexis-
tent. Accordingly, the third inquiry would militate toward finding the
attachment statute unconstitutional. Since the plaintiff has no interest
in attaching the property, and the defendant has a substantial interest
in preventing such attachment, a court should conclude that attach-
ment under any of the first four grounds would violate procedural due
process. The procedural safeguards provided by the statute, although
reducing the risk of erroneous deprivation significantly, do not reduce
the risk completely. Even with only a slight risk, there is no reason to
take a chance on erroneous deprivation when in personam jurisdic-
tion can easily be obtained over a defendant. Accordingly attachment
under these grounds is unconstitutional.
C. Proposal for a Constitutional Statute
In order for the attachment of property to be constitutional, a
state's prejudgment statutes must contain adequate procedural safe-
182. City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 717 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting
Mathews v. Elderidge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
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guards to protect the defendant's interests in his property and the
plaintiff must have a sufficient interest in seeking the attachment.'1
3
North Carolina's prejudgment statutes provide adequate procedural
safeguards, but do not limit the grounds for attachment to those
instances when a plaintiff would have a sufficient interest in attaching
the defendant's property: either when the plaintiff has a preexisting
interest in the property or when exigent circumstances exist. Thus,
section 1-440.3 of North Carolina's prejudgment statute, enumerating
the grounds for attachment, must be amended to read,
§ 1-440.3. Grounds for attachment. In those actions in which attach-
ment may be had under these statutes, an order of attachment may be
issued when:
(1) The person seeking the order has a preexisting interest in the
property to be attached, or
(2) The defendant is a person or a domestic corporation which,
with the intent to defraud his or its creditors:
a. Has removed, or is about to remove, property from this
state, or
b. Has assigned, disposed of, or secreted, or is about to
assign, dispose of, or secrete, property."8 4
Of course, additional grounds could be included if they are found to
constitute exigent circumstances.
CONCLUSION
By allowing attachment of a defendant's property without requir-
ing notice and a prior hearing, prejudgment statutes raise serious pro-
cedural due process concerns. However, prejudgment attachment of
property is not completely unconstitutional. Connecticut v. Doehr
made clear that a prejudgment statute can survive judicial scrutiny so
long as a balancing of the modified Mathews inquiries weighs in favor
of the attachment. 18 5 Since the first inquiry always weighs against the
attachment of property, it appears that a constitutional statute must
provide both substantial procedural safeguards to protect the defen-
dant and grounds for attachment in which the plaintiff has a sufficient
interest in attaching the defendant's property.
183. These are the most important factors of the modified Mathews test since the
first factor, the defendant's interest in the property, will always weigh against
attachment. Thus, a state must ensure that both of these factors weigh towards the
constitutionality of its prejudgment statutes.
184. This second ground for attachment is an exact replication of the fifth ground
under the current statute, section 1-440.3(4), which constitutes an exigent
circumstance.
185. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 10-11. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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In Schaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court greatly diminished the
importance and necessity of quasi in rem jurisdiction by holding that
any assertion of jurisdiction by a state court must comport with the
requirements of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.'86 By requiring
both in personam and quasi in rem jurisdiction to meet the same con-
stitutional standard, the cases in which a plaintiff would have a suffi-
cient interest in attaching property to merely obtain quasi in rem
jurisdiction have been severely limited, if not completely eliminated. It
seems clear, however, that when in personam jurisdiction over a defen-
dant can be acquired, the plaintiffs interest in attaching property in
order to obtain jurisdiction is nonexistent. Therefore, under this cir-
cumstance, the attachment of property, without providing notice or an
opportunity for a hearing to the defendant, violates procedural due
process. Since the first four grounds for attachment under North Car-
olina's prejudgment attachment statute are limited to this circum-
stance, 18 7 the attachment of property under these grounds would
violate procedural due process.
Jason A. Jennings
186. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). See supra notes 42-50 and
accompanying text.
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.3(1)-(4) (2007).
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